

SPHIRE OF THE PRESS.

Editorial Opinions of the Leading Journals upon Current Topics—Compiled Every Day for the Evening Telegraph.

THE PROSPECT OF THE WAR.

From the N. Y. World.

We have no definite intelligence either of the operations going on in the famous district of Ardennes and the Argennes or of the progress of the Prussian armies towards Paris. All manner of tales reach us from the headquarters of armies which, as we know, permit no news to be sent forth from their lines, and over the wires of telegraphs which, as we know, are absolutely controlled by one or another of the contending Governments. It is worse than idle to base either criticism or speculation upon such information as alone it is in the power of the most active and capable representatives of the press to accumulate from the scenes of waste and woe which all the able-bodied men of the two foremost nations of Continental Europe are now devoting all their energies to create. Reasoning from what we know positively of the conditions of military success or failure, of the resources of the two hostile powers, and of the disposition of the now neutral States of Europe, we may, however, with some degree of confidence assert it to be growing daily more and more certain that this abominable war will last much longer, cover a much wider area of desolation, and inflict upon both the parties to it vastly more suffering and disaster than either of them, or for the matter of that, the rest of the world contemplating them, four short weeks ago imagined. We ought, perhaps, to except the Emperor Napoleon, whom it is just now so easy to vituperate and so fashionable to disparage that it is almost an act of moral courage to say that he is the only conspicuous public man of either side who went into the conflict believing and asserting openly that it would be both "long and exhausting." It is true that he expected the war to be fought on French soil, and that he paid his antagonists, therefore, the tribute of anticipating from them a resistance in defense of their homes and their altars as determined and as obstinate as that which they are now destined to encounter from the invaded empire of France. It is probable, likewise, that he looked forward to a neutral attitude on the part of the South German governments, which would doubtless have facilitated the progress of French arms in North Germany, without, however, much diminishing, if at all, the persistency of the North German resistance. But these misapprehensions cannot deprive the Emperor of the credit, such as it is, of fully estimating the gravity of the prospect which opened before him when the bugles blew their first rallying blasts on the banks of the blue Moselle. On the side of the Germans, after it became clear that France was suffering the initiative of the attack to slip away from her, other illusions unquestionably took possession of the leaders' minds. It has been quite evident throughout the campaign of which a decisive act is even now passing in one of the most famous battle regions of Western Europe, that the Prussian commanders have been pressing forward to Paris under a notion that the appearance of their armies before that magnificent capital must be the signal of a great popular cataclysm in which the administrative system of France would go by the board. All the signs of the time conspire to demonstrate the fatuity of this notion, and to make it plain that the Prussians are laboring under a misconception of the political aspects of the present war in France at least as profound as the Emperor Napoleon's misconception of its political aspects in South Germany. If the Emperor exaggerated the significance in a great war crisis of the deep and genuine anti-Prussian, liberal, and progressive movement in Germany, the Prussian princes, who alone now control the action of Germany, as surely exaggerate the significance in a similar crisis of the equally deep and genuine anti-imperialist and anti-bureaucratic movement in France. That King William should fall into such a mistake as this is natural enough; but it is unnatural that Count Bismarck should share his blunder, for Count Bismarck has dealt during his remarkable career with a people much less practised in self-government than the French, and much more patient than the French of misgovernment. To bring the people of Germany to such demonstrations of hostility against a Government like that of Prussia as France during the last year has made against the government of Napoleon III, it would be necessary that the Government should have inflicted what we may call the actual century of oppression upon the people. And when a German State is brought to such demonstrations it is not far from vehement armed revolution. This was true of France a generation ago. We do not believe it to be true of France to-day.

It is not true of France to-day, it will be found, should the Prussians reach Paris and invest the city, that, instead of attaining the climax and consummation of their victories in a brilliant and satisfactory peace, they will be confronted with the ominous and dismal prospect of a war only just begun, and likely to be continued beyond the period through which it will be possible for the existing system of German and Prussian administration comfortably and successfully to conduct it. What was said by the ablest of Prussian writers on the war of 1866, that "disaster in the field was due to errors in the cabinet," was perfectly true of the rout of Austria, and not of the Austrian army only, at Koniggratz. The same thing seems to have been expected and to be now expected by Prussia to be true of France. If it proves to be false in regard to France, it is clear that it will prove to be true in regard to Prussia herself. Political misconceptions of the actual condition of France threaten now to counterbalance, in deciding the future of this dreadful contest, the advantages won by Prussia up to the present moment through the perfection and accuracy of her military organization.

PARIS.

From the N. Y. Tribune.

THE OUTBREAK OF REVOLUTION in Paris has been prevented partly by the energetic measures of the military Directory, partly by the practical resignation of power by the absent Emperor, and partly by the pervading desire among the people to offer a great show of resistance, if not a lively defense, against the foreign invader. Republicans as well as Legitimists, the Extreme Left and the old Legitimists, have joined hands with the Imperialists in a common effort to justify French patriotism and courage during a period of general peril. While we hear of the energetic way in which the old politician, M. Thiers, is instructing the military commanders about the defense of Paris, we also hear that the Red Republican Gambetta has

raised ten thousand workmen to take part in the struggle on the ramparts. It is true we have heard that General Trochu was on bad terms with the Minister of War, the Prefect of Police, and the Empress Regent; but we have, at the same time, seen him working with immense fervor at the business of raising troops, executing spies, strengthening the fortifications, expelling German residents, gathering munitions and supplies, imprisoning "dangerous characters," issuing proclamations, and preparing to receive the advancing enemy. Paris, on the whole, looks rather resolute; and if it fails to make a vigorous defense against the army of the Crown Prince, it will not be because the commanders and newspapers have not done their best to get the excitable population into fighting condition. We have no doubt, however, that if the control of affairs had been given wholly to one capable man, instead of being divided among half a dozen men, and if the newspapers, instead of being frenzied and noisy, had been strong and self-possessed, the chances of the city holding out for a few days would have been even better than they appear at present.

We earnestly hope there will be no necessity for the bombardment of Paris. It would be utter folly in Trochu to compel the Germans to take this step or even to enter upon a serious siege of the city. If the French armies in the field are routed, if the regular and organized military power of the empire is broken, it is folly to suppose that Paris can hold out for any length of time, or that the French Government can derive any advantage by exposing its population to the horrors of a siege, bombardment, or assault. Trochu would be justified, perhaps, in making a determined military defense of his fortified lines with the troops under his command; but when, as a strategist, he saw the impossibility of maintaining his position, he would have justifiable ground for capitulation.

THE EMPEROR IN FAILURE.

From the London Spectator.

One would give a good deal for a single ruler's insight into the dreams of the dejected Emperor, a commander who, whatever his nominal position at Metz, is well known to be in no state of health for any large amount of active exertion. It is apparently true that he still keeps the name of Commander-in-Chief, which he has done so much to make a name of reproach; but even in the hourly expectation of his last trial in that capacity, and with the enemy within a few miles of his great fortress, the Emperor's physical condition must compel him to leave almost everything to his subordinates in command, and must secure for him in this supreme crisis far more than can be palatable of those hours of reverie which have been the feeders at once of his power and weakness, the secrets of his achievements and his failures, of his political cunning and his military catastrophes. It would be worth a great many biographies of great men to have the chronicle of a single hour of this certainly not great, but very singular, man's reflections. M. Louis Blanc records that when he visited him in the prison at Ham, Louis Napoleon, while attempting to detail the particulars of his failure at Boulogne, uttered, "struggled a moment to repress a sob, and burst into tears"—so to some extent verifying what the most enthusiastic of his supporters, Mrs. Gordon, had said of him, "Il me fait l'effet d'une femme." We quote this not to prove that the Emperor, feeble as he has often been, deficient in courage, (for against this, despite Mr. Kinglake, there seems to us the most irrefragable historical evidence); but to show that his temperament is precisely of that brooding kind which enhances tenfold the misery of failure, and accumulates before its owner a mass of images and memories of the stake for which he had played, and the minutest details of the ruin and ignominy involved in its loss. For, Weissburg, Werth, and Forbach, with all the miscalculation and shame they involve, can leave a dejected dreamer like the Emperor, conscious of complete inability to do anything himself towards preventing their natural sequel in a general defeat of his dispirited forces, little glimpse of hope—how little, he himself betrayed in the utter despair of that fatal admission to France, "Tout peut se retablir," which is just equivalent to a physician saying, "While there is life there is hope." It is impossible to pity the murderer of French liberty and the successful poisoner of European morality, when he is but just beginning to taste the full bitterness of the fruit he has sown; but it is hardly possible to conceive, we think, of a state of mind which, were it not in the strictest sense the harvest of the thinker's own bad deeds, would more dispose to pity, than that which must haunt the Emperor in the many hours of evil omen during which M. Nelson's orders and his own conscious feebleness compel him to hold commune with himself. Next Monday is his fete day, and a day about which he has always been wont to be superstitious, as if it were a day of destiny. The slow-footed hours will this year have given him ample time for gloomy memories and still blacker anticipations.

Without pretending to divine the course of thought in one of the most inscrutable minds of our generation, it is quite worth while to conceive as distinctly as we can what trains of political reflection are likely to be to him at the present moment, most inevitable and most intolerable, for the Emperor, in fact, the impersonation of a political system, and of a political system not without a show and seductive side. Yet now, with an exhaustion both of illness and failure upon him, which must aggravate, of course, that permanent deficiency in vis and physical impulse to action which has made him the most hesitating and half-hearted of great adventurers, he must feel as if he had never really planned a great and resolute action, but only feely plotted what he might do for fortune and accomplices concerned. If he succeeded, he must think, "only when I pitted myself against institutions with as little life or vigor in them as myself. I succeeded against the Republic only when the mass of

Frenchmen were scared by the apparition of a socialism that would have destroyed society. I barely succeeded, with the aid of England, in foiling a great Russian despotism rotten at the core. I barely succeeded in Italy in inflicting a defeat that was barely more than a drawn battle on the most alien and worst-organized government which ever earned the curses of a nation. I did not even succeed against the barbarous anarchy of Mexico, and the moment a great power threw its weight into the scale, I had to retreat, and infamously leave the ruler of my choice to a shameful death. I woefully failed in curbing the despotic power of the Pope. I woefully failed in setting limits to the ambition of Prussia. And now that I have for the first time pitted myself and my people against a power really young, fresh, and full of vigor, I am starting ruin in the face, and waiting helplessly for the coup de grace. My main idea of internal government, that you can give the form of popular liberty while retaining, in an administration which has a chronic fear of the people, the means of undermining and plotting against it, will be turned out a failure. My main idea of foreign policy, that you can gratify the sentiment of patriotism and of unity of race without conceding the power which makes patriotism and unity of race formidable to neighboring ambitions, has proved a drier failure still. My scheme for freeing Italy from the foreigner, and yet not giving it to the Italians, was but the first and greatest blow against my own throne. My hope of gratifying the federal instinct of Germany without raising a new rival to France was a failure still. Whether in foreign or home policy, the limits which I plotted, to assign to the popular ideas I recognized have been more threads round the arms of a giant. And the very advantages on which I counted from imposing those limits, the advantages of a strong administration beyond the meddling of popular criticism, have proved disadvantages instead. My personal government has turned out not only corrupt but feeble, unable even to bring a strong army into the field, and to sustain the glitter of the Imperial name. I had thought that I could at once give a certain satisfaction to great popular ideas, and yet prescribe to them boundaries which they should not pass. But I failed conspicuously abroad, where every step I took towards satisfying the popular yearnings of Europe recoiled upon me, and made my own throne unstable, and now at last I have been driven to menace unsuccessfully, by arms, the extension of the very ideas which I first authoritatively introduced into the Cabinets of Europe. My best ideas are subverting my worst, and find me, at the close of my life, at the head of an army, fighting for the very ideas, and ready to be subverted by them. I am melancholy and exhausted myself, and with-out the elasticity of a genuine creed, I have always believed that human nature was to be governed through its weakness, and that its best tendencies needed very partial satisfaction; and now I find whole peoples fanatically inspired by that one of my beliefs which was nearest to a creed, and raging vehemently against me for supposing that that creed could be confined by the conditions convenient to me. The men I have exiled, the men I have murdered, the men I have sent to Cayenne, cause me no remorse. They were in my way, and I could never have been anything but a vagrant gambler if I had not put them out of my way. But for those popular ideas which I have so cautiously encouraged, and which, after slipping all their bonds, are coming back to destroy me—those, which I have called my best ideas only because they have been the most living—for the stimulus I have given to them I do feel some remorse. Might not I have admitted of forcing their development? Should I not have kept my hard-won throne longer if I had? My only permanent success has been the support of the Pope against the revolution. Had I but supported Austria against Italy first, and against Prussia next, could the new foreign policy of Europe have grown so far beyond my power to guide it as it has? Surely it would have been wiser to keep my secret—which was really the secret of the power most hostile to me—to myself, and use it only to teach me what to fear. That I, who have never had the animal spirits for a great initiative, should have myself set in motion popular forces which it would require the most peremptory and commanding initiative to restrain even for a moment, was surely the blindest of plots against myself. A dreamer like me, who not only does not enjoy action, but feels like the paralytic whose nerves will not obey his volition even when he resolves on action, ought to have put the drag on every popular movement in Europe, the passions of his own people included, rather than have sown broadcast forces which, as he could give them neither prompt guidance nor prompt resistance, are hurrying him to ruin. It may perhaps be the easier for me to lay down power, that I have never enjoyed it, but I am not sure that it is so. It is hard to think that if I had held my own counsel as to national ideas, and used more freely and persistently the instruments by which I gained my throne, I might at least have died as powerful and as inscrutable as I had lived, and never betrayed to the world the lassitude of nature and paralysis of will which, though they wholly unfit me for military command, are not entirely without their advantages for lampening the enthusiasm of nations and maintaining the dignity of a leader crown. I suppose I have been a bad man, though I hardly know the meaning of the term. But as I feel that I should be less miserable now if I had been a worse man, there can hardly be much in the superstitions which it has been my most successful and only consistent line of policy to support.

We do not suppose that such exactly have been the Emperor's reflections; but he has given a very unfair view of himself to Europe, if they have been in any great degree either more hopeful or more manly, less tinged with the cold cynicism of a prostrate mind.

THE OVERTHROW OF NAPOLEON.

From the N. Y. Herald.

Bismarck has again proved himself too much for Napoleon. He has achieved a triumph greater than that of 1866; for his success then only set aside every obstacle to Prussian ambition except France, and as France was the greatest obstacle to all, the success that had no other effect upon her but to excite irritation and enmity was not complete. It is the glory of Bismarck's latest achievement that it removes the last and greatest obstacle to Prussian policy. It sets aside France, the only remaining power competent or likely to stand in Prussia's way. Napoleon was inveigled into this war by the acts of the Prussian Premier just when Prussia was ready for it, and when the Emperor had lulled himself to a false security and faith in his power by the great political success of the Heligoland had deserved himself by the device that in his strongest days he used only to deceive others; and the

same acute politician who secured his inactivity in 1866, who by shrewd contrivances of appearances duped him to stand still when he should have done his utmost in moving, finally lured him into the blunder of moving when he should have stood still—foiled him into declaring a war whose least doubtful result must be his own downfall. His last appearance on the throne of France is scarcely in a more dignified character than that of a puppet worked by the Prussian Premier. He was tempted in 1866 by the alluring bait of the Rhine frontier. It seems to be a monomania with the French nation that it will never be happy till the commonplace Rhine is its eastern limit. Because that was once the limit of France, and France lost it, the nation's pride is bent on its recovery; and Napoleon saw the prestige it would give to his reign and reflect on the dynasty if he could restore that glory. With the hope of the chance to seize it, or the promise that he should have it, he stood still; and the war ended and the promise and the opportunity slipped away for ever. But in 1870 he saw slipping away not only the chance for a Rhine frontier but the glory of keeping intact the dignity and honor of France. He saw the nation humiliated in his reign, and the nation, skillfully irritated by the arch enemy, saw things the same way, and thus he was thrust and duped into war.

Napoleon's vanities and peculiar position uncovered him to the arts of Bismarck. His intellectual furniture is made up in great part of the splendid rubbish left by the resolute soldier of fortune, his uncle. Napoleon knew how to utter on occasion things that soothe with the spirit of democracy. He never suffered himself, however, to be controlled by them. The nephew treasures these utterances as a dynastic gospel, and does not distinguish between what the first Emperor believed in and what he said to humbug others. He is thus involved in continued inconsistencies, and it is because of the practical application of one of these pretty Napoleonic theories that he is now in imminent peril. It is because there is a united Germany that France finds herself in the hands of an overwhelmingly powerful foe; yet Louis Napoleon tried to excuse to France his inactivity in 1866 by taking a position for the Bonapartes on a political formula that assumed to reconstruct Europe by the aggregation of peoples according to nationality. This would do many things in Europe that France might contemplate without displeasure. It would give all Italy to the Italians, and so prove a fair stroke for the Latin nations. It would render Austria piecemeal. It would put the British empire in liquidation. It would disturb Russia. It would take from Prussia her half digested out of Poland. All this would be satisfactory in a Napoleonic view, perhaps. But there is one other thing it would do, that in its danger to France would infinitely overbear all self-complacent views of the disasters of others: it would give her a great German nation for her next door neighbor—a nation of people hostile by tradition, opposed in character and sentiment, and having century-long scores of humiliation to revenge. It would at one step forfeit that supremacy which the division of others that the political policy of every French dynasty has built up. Committing himself to this philanthropic blunder, Napoleon made it easier for Bismarck to assimilate all the Northern German States, and to approach the States of South Germany with the conditional alliance that now puts Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg side by side with Prussia in arms. And who doubts that the Emperor has at last helped the Prussian over his most difficult ground by furnishing the war whose fire shall fuse these all into one nation?

Yet what are all these evasions but so many lessons teaching the people their power? Bismarck and the Prussian monarch move in a whirl of success and supremacy just now, because their purposes coincide with the national development and tendencies of the great German people. They assist and give the opportunity to this development, and in so doing they encourage, beyond all calculation, its further progress. What is naturally the ultimate aim of this progress? Not to satiate the ambition of a few Prussian princes, but to emancipate a great people from all tyranny, and enable them to work out their destinies, subject only to such a rational control by Government as they may then in their own intelligence and freedom choose to submit to. In other words, the tendency in Central Europe to-day is towards a grand German republic. In setting free the forces that have enabled them to conquer France and overthrow Napoleon, the men who now direct the Prussian policy have set free the forces that will drive them out—that will tumble the Prussian throne, with other thrones, and by which the people can conquer their right of self-government. In the brain of universal Germany this idea has come by such imperceptible steps that it may be called a growth—first to be, next to be free; first to be assured of existence, next to qualify the modes of that existence. Germany is now essentially one. The people of all her States have fought side by side for a common German purpose, excepting only the people of the Austrian States, who have, however, given their active sympathies and open encouragement. Thus the first great stage is secured, and the second is not far away, for we live in a time of rapid transition. The next study of the Prussian King and his Ministers may be how to further develop and wield the power of the German people, but how to control and suppress it. The Austrian monarchy and the French monarchy are two foes the German nation has crushed. The Prussian monarchy must be the next victim.

THE FRENCH COLONIES.

From the N. Y. Times.

There are other ways in which France may be amended by way of penalty for beginning and losing the present tremendous conflict, besides depriving her of Alsace or Lorraine, or otherwise curtailing her home territory. She possesses colonies—considerable, truly, both in area and population, when compared with those of England, but which might prove of great value to a nation like Prussia, having so limited a seaboard, and ambitious of adding to her power by her magnificent military resources. In Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania, France governs dependencies which, considering her own navy, it might be difficult to win from her by the sword, but which might be readily acquired by her successful enemy as conditions of a new treaty of Paris. Should Prussia be as conclusively triumphant in the pending war as now seems probable, it may be presumed that the importance of acquiring facilities for maritime development will not be lost sight of. It is undeniable, as the World has pointed out, that the blockade of the Baltic and the North Sea by the French fleet chokes the trade of a dozen great German cities, and stints supplies to their vast subsidiary populations, thus inflicting great, if temporary, injury. To guard against such

an evil in the future, or even partially to cope with it, Germany needs settling colonies where her ships can gather in safety, can coal, refit, and victual, and rally forth as occasion serves, to meet the enemy on the high seas, and to break or run the blockade of her home ports.

Now, in America, France possesses Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guiana, besides the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, these colonies having an aggregate population of about 350,000 souls. In Asia the French possessions include, besides the provinces of Cochinchina, with a population of about a million, the valuable points of Pondichery, Chandernagore, Karikal, Maha, and Yanaon. In Africa France has holds in Senegambia, Gabon, the Gold Coast, and the islands of Reunion, St. Marie, Mayotte, and Moasi-Be, with peoples exceeding a million; and in Oceania, New Caledonia, and the Marquesas and Loyalty Islands. Added to these actual sovereignties, France wields a protectorate over the Kingdom of Cambodia, Porto Novo in Africa, Tahiti, Gambier, and other islands of the Polynesian group that substantially augment her influence, and prospectively, if not immediately, her strength. These places do not, to be sure, like the colonies of England, constitute elements of power by furnishing immense markets for home manufactures, but as marine depots several of them are of serious importance, and for an inland country like Germany they might in time become of incalculable value. Other European powers may object to any material absorption by Prussia of the area of Alsace and Lorraine; but a diminution of French colonial possessions is unlikely to excite any jealousy. Such a procedure is consequently not unlikely to form the subject matter of a clause in any treaty of peace which follows the existing war. By similar concessions France has often before settled the balance of an unsuccessful contest, and the plan may be once more tried with success.

THE CHINESE LABOR QUESTION.

From the Boston Advertiser.

The interesting letter of Judge Kelley on the Chinese labor question will attract the attention of all who have given any thought to the recent phases of that problem. While his essential positions are unquestionably sound, we do not agree with him as to the feasibility of legislation to correct the mischief which he fears. The right of every man to dispose of his labor in his own way is inherent and inalienable; there is nothing in the nature of a Chinaman to render him less entitled to a privilege which we claim for ourselves, and which, under ordinary circumstances, we cheerfully accord to the rest of mankind. The good sense and regard for justice in the community must be trusted to see that the privilege is not taken to the advantage of, to their own and the public injury, by any individual employer who understands his own interests chooses to fill his service with ignorant, degraded, and ill-paid laborers, whom he has cheated with a dishonest contract, and all whose feelings and interests are at war with his own. Mr. Sampson has no motive for filling his factory with a chain-gang of vicious pagans, who have no idea of staying with him beyond the time of their contract, or of adapting themselves to the situation while they remain. The risk of danger from such importations into any civilized community where there is a moderate supply of labor, is a decent regard for the common welfare, is nothing compared to the injustice of laws nullifying honest contracts between men who are competent to judge for themselves.

While we take this position against interference by legislation with such contracts entered into by parties intelligently and in good faith—on the same principle that we object to fixing the hours of labor or the price of commodities by law—we fully agree that it is not wise to encourage the introduction of unskilled and poorly-paid labor in our factories, and it is not just to force such labor into competition with that which has grown up on our soil. But the remedy is to be found not in laws which restrict the power of individuals to work out their own destiny in their own way, but in the inevitable laws of trade, modified by an enlightened public opinion, and a considerate and just disposition on the part of workmen and employers. In some portions of the country, where the opportunities and demands for labor are greatly in excess of the laborers, the prosecution of great works which have wonderfully increased the wealth of the country would not have been possible without the associated labor which has come here under these much-abused and much-misunderstood contracts. But there is no necessity for procuring labor on such terms in Massachusetts, nor indeed in any of the older States; and we do not believe there is the slightest danger that it will ever gain a substantial foothold on this side of the continent. Mr. Sampson's experiment is an exceptional one, and although it may prove entirely successful under his skillful management, it is not likely to be followed except under the most exceptional circumstances. But the right to follow it is as clear as undeniable as the right of workmen to associate themselves together for their common advantage.

The subject is worthy of the attention which Judge Kelley has given it. It should be treated always in a spirit which, instead of arraying the workmen on one side and the employers on the other, will bring intelligent workmen and employers together to consider how the most equitable exchange of advantages can be made. The genuine labor reform will be the result, not of a triumph of one class over another, but of a common good understanding between them. It is in the power of employers to contribute to this by timely and reasonable concessions, and of workmen by conceding to employers the rights which they claim for themselves.

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THE REGULAR STEAMSHIPS OF THE PHILADELPHIA AND CHARLESTON STEAMSHIP LINE ARE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE THROUGH BILLS OF LADING TO INTERIOR PORTS SOUTH AND WEST in connection with South Carolina Railroad Company. JOHN F. WHARVES, Vice-President, No. 3, R.R. Co.

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PHILADELPHIA AND SOUTHERN MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY'S REGULAR SEMI-MONTHLY LINE TO NEW ORLEANS. The ABOLITES will sail for New Orleans direct, on Tuesday, August 31, at 5 A. M. The YAZOO will sail from New Orleans, via Havana, on Wednesday, September 1, at 10 A. M. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING at as low rates as by any other route given to Mobile, Galveston, Indianola, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee in connection with the Central Railroad of Georgia, Atlantic and Gulf Railroad, and Florida steamships, at as low rates as by connecting lines. SEMI-MONTHLY LINE TO WASHINGTON, N. O. The YORKVILLE will sail for Washington on Wednesday, August 31, at 6 A. M. Returning, on Wednesday, September 7, at 10 A. M. The YORKVILLE will sail for New Orleans, via Havana, on Wednesday, September 1, at 10 A. M. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING at as low rates as by any other route given to Mobile, Galveston, Indianola, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee in connection with the Central Railroad of Georgia, Atlantic and Gulf Railroad, and Florida steamships, at as low rates as by connecting lines. No charge for commission, drayage, or any expense of transfer. Steamships insure at lowest rates. Freight received daily. Bills of lading signed for passengers. W. P. ISH WHEAR, Agent at Philadelphia and City Point. T. F. GROWELL & CO., Agents at Norfolk. 614

PHILADELPHIA, RICHMOND, AND NORFOLK STEAMSHIP LINE THROUGH FREIGHT AIR LINE TO THE SOUTH AND WEST. INCREASED FACILITIES AND REDUCED RATES. Steamers leave every WEDNESDAY AND SATURDAY at 10 o'clock noon, from FIRST WHARF above MARKET STREET, for Richmond, Va., and Norfolk, Va. RETURNING, leave RICHMOND MONDAYS AND THURSDAYS, and leave NORFOLK SATURDAYS AND TUESDAYS. No bills of lading signed after 12 o'clock on sailing. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING at all points in North and South Carolina, via the Richmond Air Line Railroad, connecting at Portsmouth, and to Lynchburg, Va., Tennessee, and the West, via the Virginia, Tennessee Air Line and Richmond and Norfolk Railroad. Freight HANDLED WITHOUT CHARGE and taken at LOWER RATES than by any other route. No charge for commission, drayage, or any expense of transfer. Steamships insure at lowest rates. Freight received daily. Bills of lading signed for passengers. W. P. ISH WHEAR, Agent at Philadelphia and City Point. T. F. GROWELL & CO., Agents at Norfolk. 614

FOR NEW YORK, VIA DELAWARE AND CHESAPEAKE STEAM TOWBOAT COMPANY. DISPATCH AND SWIFTEST LINES. Leaving daily at 12 M. and 5 P. M. The steam propellers of this company will commence loading on the 8th of March. Through bills of lading at Alexandria from the most direct route for Lynchburg, Bristol, Knoxville, Nashville, Dalton, and the Southwest. Steamers leave regularly every Saturday at noon from the first wharf above Market Street. Freight received daily. WILLIAM P. CLYDE & CO., Agents, No. 14 North and South WHARVES. HYDE & TYLER, Agents at Georgetown; M. ELDRIDGE & CO., Agents at Alexandria. 61

FOR NEW YORK EXPRESS STEAMBOAT COMPANY. The Steam Propellers of the line will commence loading on the 8th instant, leaving daily as usual. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING at as low rates as by any other route given to New York, North, East, or West, free of commission. Freight received at lowest rates. WILLIAM P. CLYDE & CO., Agents, No. 12 N. DELAWARE AVENUE. JAMES HAND, Agent, No. 119 Wall Street, New York. 343

CORDAGE, ETC. WEAVER & CO., ROPE MANUFACTURERS AND SHIP CHANDLERS. No. 22 NORTH WATER Street and No. 25 NORTH WHARVES, Philadelphia. ROPE AT LOWEST BOSTON AND NEW YORK PRICES. 41

CORDAGE. Manila, Sisal and Tarrad Cordage. At Lowest New York Prices and Freight. EDWIN H. FITLER & CO., Factory, TERTH ST. and GERMANTOWN Avenues. Store, No. 22 N. WATER ST. and 25 N. DELAWARE AVENUE.

WHISKY, WINE, ETC. CARSTAIRS & McCALL, No. 126 Walnut and 21 Granite Sts. IMPORTERS OF Brandies, Wines, Gin, Olive Oil, Etc. WHOLESALE DEALERS IN PURE RYE WHISKIES. IN BOND AND TAX PAID. 257 1/2

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